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1.   INTRODUCTION 
The theory of optimal taxation has tended to recast the existing literature of 
public finance into the mould of classical welfare economics by emphasising 
minimisation of dead weight losses resulting from the imposition of a tax or faulty 
tax structure. As such, these modern theories have much in common with the 
traditional approach in terms of efficiency and equity.  In spite of this, however, the 
differences remain.   For example, the former theories adhere strictly to the norms of 
classical welfare economics which treats individual consumers as utility maximisers 
where improvements in welfare involve change that makes one individual better-off 
without making someone else worse-off  [Stern  (1987)].  In contrast to the emphasis 
of traditional theories on lump-sum taxes, the optimum tax literature is concerned 
with the implication of using non-lump-sum taxes which have a wider range and 
therefore  more useful to the policy-maker.  The recent work on normative tax theory 
looks at the impact of taxation on individual decisions and the trade off between 
raising revenues or redistributing tax burdens and the efficiency losses [Atkinson 
(1987)]. Finally, the optimal tax literature may be more pragmatic in its approach 
than traditional works as it realistically deals with government objectives and 
constraints and combines them into models that are sufficiently rich to allow for 
differences between people regarding income and expenditure patterns. 
In spite of some important developments, the optimal tax theory is still in its  
infancy and its application  to real situations has not been widespread. The 
application on the theory and development of appropriate models in agriculture has 
been even more limited in view of complexity of production system and limited 
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availability of tax instruments in agriculture. This follows from Newbery’s statement 
that the positive theory of agricultural tax analysis is therefore more complicated 
than the simple model of optimal taxation [Newbery (1987)]. 
Given this situation, the present paper is aimed at devising a tax system for 
Pakistan’s agriculture that comes closest to the limited and scattered principles of 
optimal tax theory.  To attain this purpose, Section 2 following this introductory 
section reviews the principles of optimal taxations as laid down in some of the key 
studies.  Section 3 looks at the current system of agricultural taxation along with its 
limitations.  Section 4 comprises of policy prescription that comes closes to 
principles of optimal taxation.  Section 5 presents main findings in the form of 
summary. 
 
2.  SOME PRINCIPLES OF OPTIMAL TAX DESIGN 
    It follows from above that efficiency and equity remain the main 
considerations of optimal taxation subject of course to government objectives, 
constraints and availability of tax instruments as dictated by the socio-economic and 
political situation in the country concerned.  As, however, the emphasis is on 
minimisation of efficiency losses arising from raising a given amount of revenue or 
redistributing income, efficiency goal remains in the forefront.  The optimal tax 
theory within these limits lays down rules for achieving the set targets of revenue as 
follows: 
Firstly, tax revenue is raised most efficiently by taxing goods or factors with 
inelastic demand or supply and tax rates should vary inversely with price elasticities 
of demand and supply [Sah, Kumar and Stiglitz (1987) as follows: 
t = (1–B/e) 1/n 
Where “t” = tax rates, “B” is a constant, “e” = price elasticity of demand and 
“n” refers to price elasticity of supply.  It should be noted that the equation followed 
from peasants’ consumption and output maximising behaviour under the assumption 
of absence of cross price elasticities of demand and supply. 
Secondly, taxation concerned with distribution, externalities or market failures 
should as much as possible go to the root cause of the problem [Stern (1987)] and 
impose taxes accordingly. 
Thirdly, we must realise that it will be impossible to deal perfectly with 
question of distribution and market failure directly and a target-instrument approach 
may be treacherous in a second-best world.  In this context, a range of policy tools  
may be required [Stern (1987)]. 
Fourthly, tax choices between various indirect taxes especially those on gross  
and marketed output in agriculture, have been elaborated upon in Newbery (1987). 
According to him, a uniform tax on marketed surplus does not change relative 
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leaves both relative producer and consumer prices unchanged.  A tax on gross output 
is therefore superior to a tax on marketed surplus.  However, a tax on gross output is 
administratively costly and unnecessary when the optimal tax on food is zero, which 
adds to the superiority of marketed surplus tax. 
Fifth, a direct tax such as a land tax per unit of land has an upper limit 
determined by profit rates per unit of land.  Tax rates exceeding this limit drive the 
farm households into destitution and should be avoided.  Also tax rates cannot rise so 
sharply with farm size that they make a farm household with more land actually 
worse-off than a smaller one.  The implication of this analysis is that only simple 
forms of lump-sum taxes may be employed [Atkinson (1987)].  The conclusion is 
consistent with traditional theories [Bird  (1974)] and with the theoretical arguments 
of optional tax theory [Newbery (1987)], which postulated that progressive land 
taxes or land taxes that depend on owner’s income or wealth introduce considerable 
complexity, frequently provoke effective political opposition and can be evaded by 
subdivision.  The evidence strongly suggests that complex land taxes are impractical. 
Still simple land taxes on administrative grounds, evidence suggests, are practical. 
Finally, the design of tax structures is highly sensitive to economic 
environment in which it operates [Hoff and Stiglitz (1993)], especially in the 
developing countries because of missing or imperfect markets, limited government 
information, absence of credit rationing  and limited risk markets.  Although the 
simplicity of land tax may not be quite demanding with respect to the first two 
factors, the latter two are critically important as the land tax does not vary with 
output and the farmer has to bear the full risk of any shortfalls in output resulting 
from inclement weather or market failures.  By contrast, taxes that are related to 
output are state-contingent and represent a sharing and pooling of risk. 
 
3.  PRESENT SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL TAXATION 
    Agriculture in Pakistan is subjected to direct, indirect and implicit taxes and 
the list has been expanding in the recent years.  For example, although land revenue, 
and its cesses and Ushr were major direct taxes in agriculture, agricultural income 
tax has evolved as an independent levy since 1993 when presumptive farm incomes 
were taxed at Rs 2.00 per Produce Index Unit (PIU) with a basic exemption of 4000 
PIUs per farm. Since 1996, most provinces in compliance with Agricultural Income 
Tax Ordinance introduced varying rates of taxes, exemptions and tax bases [World 
Bank (1999)]. Under 2001–2002 budget, the general income tax has been extended 
to  agricultural sector as well [Hyder  (2001)].  In spite of these changes and despite 
an almost 8-fold increase in receipts over the decade of the 1990s, the share of direct 
taxes as a percent of value-added by agriculture remains below one percent 
[Chaudhry  (2001)]. 
Although not specific to agriculture, the indirect taxes like customs duties, 
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ultimate payment [Newbery (1987)]. Although customs duties were nearly 55 
percent of indirect taxes in 1990-91, their share was reduced to 23 percent by 2000-
01.  Likewise, the share of excise duty fell from nearly 28 percent to 18 percent over 
the decade.   By contrast, the contribution of general sales tax witnessed a drastic 
increase from 18 percent in 1990-91 to almost 59 percent in 2000-01 [Pakistan 
(2001)].  As the latter tax is more widespread than the other two, the increasing 
incidence of the indirect taxes on agriculture can be expected.  Based on the relative 
consumption of taxed commodities, it has been noted that agriculture’s share in 
indirect taxes rose from Rs 61 billion in 1989–90 to Rs 177 billion in 1999-2000.  
The latter year’s figure corresponds almost with 23.2 percent of value-added by 
agriculture [Chaudhry  (2001)].  On top of all this government plans to impose the 
additional sales tax of 15 percent on fertilisers and pesticides.  Being 15-20 percent 
of cost of production various commodities [Malik and Khan  (2000)], a 15 percent 
tax  on fertilisers and pesticides should add another 2-3 percent to tax burden in 
agriculture in the near future. 
The quantitative estimates of implicit taxes based on parity and support prices 
at official and market exchange rates indicate a fall from nearly Rs 82 billion in  
1989-90 to Rs 65 billion in 1999-2000.  The decline was mainly caused by reduction 
in over-valuation of Rupee and to a lesser extent in improvement of support prices 
relative to falling world prices of major agricultural commodities. In spite of the 
lower magnitude of implicit taxes in 1999-2000, they still represent 7-8.5 percent of 
value added by agriculture. 
Apart from provincial and federal taxes listed above, the local governments 
under the devolution plan will also be empowered to impose various kinds of 38 
taxes [Bokhari  (2000)].  It is not yet clear as to what would be the nature and 
magnitude of these taxes and what part of them would ultimately be paid by 
agriculture?  However, given the long list of taxes and autonomy of the local 
councils to levy taxes, a 2-3 percent of agriculture’s value added may be anybody’s 
guess as a contribution of the farm sector. 
Looking at the current system of agricultural taxation in the context of optimal 
tax policy, there can be no doubt that tax burdens in agriculture are immensely heavy 
and the new taxes of income tax, a 15 percent sales tax on agricultural inputs and 
taxes by local councils have the potential to drive agriculture to bankruptcy.  The 
heavy reliance on indirect taxes makes the system highly inequitable.  Although 
agricultural income tax may restore some equity to the system, the tax on fertiliser is 
likely to fall heavily on small farmers due to inverse relationship between fertiliser 
application rates per acre and farm size [Ahmed and Chaudhry (2000)]. The 
agricultural tax system puts no pressure on the farm sector for efficient land use as 
most of the indirect taxes, agricultural income tax and land tax based on cultivated 
area are unlikely to force farmers to bring uncultivated land under cultivation and use 
land more intensively.  To the extent that fertiliser application rates in Pakistan are Optimal Taxation and Current Tax Policy  493
considerably lower than the recommended optimal levels, a tax on fertiliser may be 
counter productive.  What is more important to note is the fact that the introduction 
of agricultural income tax would be highly problematic because of complex 
procedures of calculation of agricultural incomes, inaccessibility of rural areas, 
administrative inefficiencies of the revenue staff and the widespread corruption that 
it may entail. 
Given this situation, it may not be worthwhile to continue with the indirect 
taxes for reasons of equity, efficiency, economic stability and revenue generation. As 
the recent moves of agricultural income tax, a sales tax on agricultural inputs and 
local council taxes are equally incapacitated to achieve these objectives, one must 
think of alternative policy options.  This by the way is the subject of the following 
section. 
 
4.   DEVISING AN AGRICULTURAL TAX POLICY 
It should be clear from above that the choice of a tax instrument that is 
consistent with the prescription of optimal tax principles becomes extremely limited 
because no single tax instrument can be perfectly neutral with respect to allocation 
[World Bank (1988)].  To the extent that the objective of the optimal taxation is to 
minimise welfare losses of consumers and producers to raise a given amount of 
revenue, it seems advisable to combine two or more tax instruments for achieving 
the targets.  Given the non-conducive tax environment in Pakistan’s agriculture and 
the pitfalls of tax administration, the most rational agricultural policy involves two-
tier system comprising of a simple land tax and a tax on marketed surplus.  However, 
to rid the agriculture of onerous tax burdens, tax rates in agriculture should not 
exceed 5-6 percent of agriculture’s value added.  This follows from horizontal equity 
considerations as the current national tax rates are only about 15 percent and 
agriculture’s incomes are only one-third relative to the rest of the economy on a per 
worker basis. 
There can be little doubt about the feasibility of a simple land tax on 
administrative grounds as argued above.  The poor quality of revenue administration 
makes it all the more important in the case of Pakistan and undermines the scope of 
introducing any graduated land tax like the current land revenue system and 
agricultural income tax.  From the optimal tax point of view, land has been regarded 
as a natural base for tax because it is in inelastic supply [Ahmed and Stern (1989) 
and Newbery  (1987)] and is readily observable [Skinner  (1993)].  To the extent that 
ownership of land (cultivated or uncultivated and cropped or uncropped) is even 
more inelastic and observable, it should be a more natural base of land tax compared 
to the current practice of taxing cultivated and cropped land in Pakistan.  The shifting  
of the tax base from cultivated or cropland to ownership (farm area as defined in 
agricultural census) should ensure greater efficiency of land use and reduce 
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tax on uncultivated (idle) land and consequent reduction in land resources kept for 
speculative purposes [Musgrave  (1987)].  The tax base change should eliminate the 
need for seasonal crop records along with the associated corrupt staff and induce 
savings in costs both to the government exchequer and to the farm community.  It 
may be noted that ownership records are available at the district level and their 
updating is not a problem as landowners have strong incentive to establish legal titles 
to their land [Burgess and Stern  (1993)].   
To make land tax even simpler, workable and more cost effective, the tax 
should be imposed on unimproved value of land irrespective of its productivity, 
irrigation status or nearness to market etc.  While productivity ratings have been a 
source of corruption and tax evasion, to do away with them would eliminate such 
practices and at the same time rid the government of costly and frequently needed 
land assessments and productivity surveys. 
As a matter of principle and to discourage subdivision of agricultural 
holdings, especially that arising out of tax evasion efforts, all farmland should be 
taxable at a single uniform rate without any exemptions.  The proposal must ensure 
stable tax revenues for the government with the widest possible tax base.  However, 
tax rates should be kept sufficiently low as not to drive the peasants households into 
destitution.  [Atkinson  (1987).] 
To the extent that revenue demands of each farmer are fixed, any productivity 
gains will be harvested by him.  This should act as an added incentive to farmland  
more productively.  Japan’s experience during Meiji’s era seems to be highly 
relevant in this regard as it has been argued in many studies that it was basically 
fixed land tax system which led to rapid transformation of Japan at that time. 
Finally, the land tax policy suggested above can be regarded as non-
discriminatory and non-distortionary on all accounts as is generally held in the 
traditional as well as in optimal tax literature [Newbery  (1987)].  Although basically 
treated as inequitable, the land taxes might prove to be somewhat equitable if farm 
productivity varies inversely with farm size.  Empirical studies on size-productivity 
relationship in Pakistan point to the negative correlation [Ahmed and Chaudhry   
(2000);  Chaudhry and Azhar  (1997) and Herring and Chaudhry (1974)].  If so, the 
regressive character of a proportional land tax might be considerably dampened. 
In spite of these good qualities, land taxes may be regarded as poor revenue 
raisers.   Being fixed in perpetuity, they cannot meet the rising revenue needs of a 
growing economy.  They are basically income and price inelastic and are likely to 
loose their significance in real terms under inflationary conditions and rapidly rising 
farm incomes.  A land-based tax would also be unsuited to cover incomes from 
commercial livestock farms operated with purchased fodders and feeds.  In addition, 
it may also be inferred that the suggested land tax may not be adequate to redress the 
large inequalities of land distribution.  Furthermore, the land tax may expose the 
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indiscriminate use of the policy to raise more revenue.  Farmers in Pakistan may be 
especially vulnerable to such risks under uncertain production conditions and lack of 
adequate credit facilities [Kurosaki and Khan (2001)]. 
Many of the above deficiencies and drawbacks of the land tax can be 
alleviated or eliminated totally by an additional tax on the marketed surplus.  It was 
pointed out long ago that “in certain respects, a tax on marketed produce has unique 
qualifications as an instrument of equitable taxation…… the tax is responsive to 
production and prices……. The incidence of such a tax as distinguished from that of 
land revenue will be appropriately heavy on the large land holders, while the small 
land holder, to the extent his crop is not sold by him will not have to bear the tax at 
all”. [Wald (1959)]. Following in the footsteps of the above argument, the 
appropriateness of the marketed surplus tax is greatly enhanced in Pakistan due to 
many factors.  The tax has a dynamic base and can be regarded to be highly elastic 
with respect to output or farm incomes in view of the evidence that agricultural 
marketed surplus in general is likely to grow at a faster pace than agricultural output 
[Johnston and Kilby  (1975)].  The tax can also be made price responsive by taxing 
value of the output instead of marketed output.  Doing so would ensure rapid growth 
of revenue both in nominal and real terms, add to the macro-economic stability and 
make the system state-contingent.  It  has been  demonstrated that a tax on marketed 
surplus in combination with a land tax  is preferable and Pareto-efficient relative to 
either tax alone [Hoof and Stiglitz  (1993)]. 
A tax on marketed surplus is uniquely placed to address the equity issue even 
under its proportional and uniform rate structure and without explicit exemptions for  
overcoming the problem of regressivety of land taxes for many reasons. 
Firstly, the evidence in Pakistan indicates that marketed surplus as a 
percentage of output varies directly with farm size [Ahmed and Chaudhry (2000)].  
In the absence of tax shifting [Newbery  (1987)], a uniform rate structure of a tax on 
marketed output, should, therefore, fall heavily on large farmers and be progressive 
in its impact.  To the extent that most tenants and small farmers, subsist on farm 
output and have little marketable surplus, would automatically be exempted from the 
payment.  As this forecloses the need for explicit exemptions, there is no scope for 
tax evasion through subdivision of holdings. 
Secondly, although inaccessibility of rural areas tends to limit the scope of 
most taxes in agriculture, farmers become easily accessible at the market place for 
assessment and collection of a marketed surplus tax. 
Thirdly, the tax may be implemented through the local bodies to avoid the 
additional costs, as they will increasingly become responsible for tax collection 
under the current government’s Fiscal Devolution Plan for local self-governments.  
The old system of Octroi (market entry tax) may be instructive in this regard and 
leasing out tax collection powers to private sector is a viable way of reducing tax 
collection costs and tax evasions as the large farmers will be less influential with 
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As a land tax does not cover taxation of commercial livestock sector, the tax 
on marketed surplus can profitably be extended to animal sales.  Animals kept for 
domestic needs like self-consumption of agricultural commodities would be 
automatically exempted.  This seems to be quite fair in view of large income tax 
exemption to meet the expenditure on basic necessities of life. 
It should be realised that the whole idea of combining the two taxes was to 
evolve a workable system of agricultural taxation that would ensure greater and 
rising revenues in an efficient and equitable fashion.  How far have we succeeded 
can be seen from the data presented in the following Table 1 that is based on current 
average land revenue rates and a 5.0 percent tax on marketed surplus of 5 major 
commodities including wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane and maize. 
 
Table 1 
Revenue Generation and Progressiveness of Combined Taxes  
on Land and Marketed Surplus 
Farm Size Groups in Acres under 
Description 
2.5 2.5-5.0  5.0-12.5  12.5-25  25-50  50  and 
Above 
1. Gross Value of Output    
    (Rs Thousand)  13.80  28.83  58.76  115.58  187.82  429.87 
2. Value of Marketed    
    Output (Rs Thousands)  5.34  14.60  32.27  79.74  135.85  406.92 
3. Tax at 5 Percent of  
    Marketed Value  
    (Rs Thousands)  0.27  0.73  16.2  3.98  6.78  21.35 
4. Average Farm Size (Acres)  1.77  4.07  8.88  18.39  37.02  106.59 
5. Tax at Rs 50.00 per  
    Acre (Rs Thousand)  0.09  0.20  0.44  0.92  1.85  5.33 
6. Tax Amount per Farm  
    (Rs 000)  0.36 0.93  2.06  4.90 8.63  26.68 
7. Tax as Percent of Farm Income  2.60  3.23  3.50  4.24  4.60  6.20 
8. Number of Farms (Millions) 1.68  1.06  1.70  0.62 0.24 0.11 
9. Total Tax Revenue  
    (Rs Billions)  1.60  0.99  3.50  3.04. 2.07 2.94 
Source: [Ahmad and Chaudhry  (2000) and Pakistan  (1993)]. 
 
It is evident from Table 1 that even the current average land revenue rates 
combined with a meagre 5.0 percent tax on marketed surplus can result in more than 
double the revenue (sum of last row) currently derived from direct taxes in Pakistan. 
It may be noted as pointed out above, however, that these figures exclude revenues 
that would be generated by tax on marketed surplus of more valuable crops such as 
vegetables, fruits and sale of livestock and livestock products.  The table also shows 
as to how the two basically proportional taxes can be combined to introduce indirect 
progression into Pakistan’s agricultural tax system.  Looking at row 7 of the table, it 
is clear that this two-tier tax system involves only 2.6.8 percent of the gross income 
of the smallest farm size group as against 6.2 percent of that of the largest group. It Optimal Taxation and Current Tax Policy  497
should also be noted that the collectable tax amounts even in the case of smallest 
farm size group (row 6) do not exceed Rs 360 and cannot be regarded unnecessarily 
burdensome in relation to gross income and marketed surplus. 
Realistically speaking, the tax burdens must be looked in the light of net farm 
incomes as tax burdens could become really onerous if the costs of production 
become excessively high leaving little income in the hands of the farmers.   Although 
net farm income data by farm size are not available, cost of production studies 
(including land rent and own labour costs) in Pakistan indicate that rates of return in  
agriculture do not exceed 10.0–15.0 percent on various crops [APCom (n.d.)].  This 
may force many small farmers to engage in distress sales for payment of taxes.   
Furthermore, a tax of marketed surplus may be accompanied by deleterious effects 
on farm and marketed output and complicate the situation further. 
In spite of the potential possibility of the above two factors, they are unlikely 
to be major problems in the future.  For example, studies in Pakistan found no 
evidence of distress food sales by the farm household [Naqvi and Cornelisse  (1986)] 
and their occurrence in future has been considerably reduced by the increased wheat 
productivity in the recent years relative to 1980s.  The likelihood of distress sales by 
the farm sector may also be reduced by reciprocity-based informal credit among the 
farmers [Kurosaki and Khan (2001)].  In addition, the suggested tax on marketed 
surplus is only 3.0 percent in contrast to historically significant implicit tax rates of 
40.0–50.0 percent until the early 1990s and exceeding 20.0 percent even in the recent 
years. To the extent that this two-tier system would replace the implicit taxation of 
agriculture by assuring world prices, agricultural output should be favourably 
affected on all farm size categories.  The disincentive affect of a tax on marketed 
output may also be considerably dampened by the presence of land tax ensuring 
more productive land use. 
In addition to discontinuation of implicit taxation of agriculture, Pakistan in 
general need to move increasingly toward direct taxes for a clearer specification of 
relative tax burdens of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and desist from 
indirect taxes.  Although the above-suggested policy is capable of generating more 
revenues from agriculture in terms of its income relative to direct taxes in the non-
agricultural sector, it is the impact of indirect taxes that over burdens the agricultural 
sector.  Obviously, the government has moved somewhat in that direction in the 
1990s but a more definite reformed and planed action seems to be a dire necessity to 
reduce agriculture’s tax burdens and to put this reformed policy in place at an early 
date for the betterment of agriculture. 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides a review of optimal tax theory and its basic principles. 
The underlying purpose of this review is to devise an appropriate tax policy for 
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taxation.  On the basis of incidence analysis of various taxes, the paper highlights the 
pitfalls of the current tax policy in terms of equity, efficiency, economic stability and 
their revenue generation capacity.  Being highly onerous the current tax policy is 
likely to drive the farm sector towards bankruptcy especially under the added 
burdens of agricultural income tax, a 15 percent sales tax on agricultural inputs and a 
long list of taxes by the local governments. 
This being so, the current system of agricultural taxation should by replaced by a 
combination of a proportional land tax and a tax on  marketed output because of latter’s 
greater appropriateness under Pakistan’s conditions.  Furthermore, this two-tier system of 
agricultural taxation has all the desirable characteristics of a rational tax policy and would 
largely be consistent with the theory of optimal taxation.  For example, a proportional 
land tax based on owner’s farm area (cultivated or uncultivated) is preferable over the 
current tax policy changes because, as was argued before, it will keep the tax base stable 
and relatively broader, will reduce the temptation for undue subdivision of landholdings, 
will avoid the possibility of declining absolute tax revenues over time, will ensure 
efficient use of resources, and above all will be easy to administer. 
A proportional land tax, although in line with optimal tax rules, is inherently 
handicapped by its inequitableness, income and price inelasticities and is risk prone. 
A tax on the marketed produce is best suited to overcome these deficiencies of 
agricultural taxation.  For example, the incidence of such a tax, as distinguished from 
that of land revenue, will be appropriately heavy on the large landholders.  While the 
small landholder, to the extent that his crop is consumed and not sold by him will not 
have to bear the tax at all.  Similarly, the tenants will not be subjected to heavier tax 
rates along with the large landholders, the largest producers of marketed surplus.  
The tax base will be widening and the revenue from the tax on marketed produce 
will be expected to grow at the rate of growth of the marketed surplus plus the rate of  
increase in prices of  agricultural commodities.  In the case of crop failures and 
market gluts, tax payments by farmers will automatically be reduced for relief 
against unforeseeable events. This tax-sharing arrangement thus reduces the farmer’s 
vulnerability to risk and makes the tax more desirable in terms of optimal tax theory.  
The tax may be implemented through the local bodies administration to avoid any 
additional cost as the local bodies in the recent past were collecting a similar tax on 
agricultural commodities and have now been given additional powers under the 
current government’s Devolution Plan.  The tax in addition will avoid tax evasion, as 
the farmers will be easily approachable at the market place.  Moreover, there will be 
less corruption because the tax collectors will be closely supervised. 
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The paper provides a review of optimal tax theory and its basic principles. 
The underlying purpose of this review is to devise an appropriate tax policy for 
Pakistan’s agriculture that is, more or less, consistent with the norms of optimal 
taxation. On the basis of incidence analysis of various taxes, the paper highlights the 
shortfalls of the current tax policy in terms of equity, efficiency, economic stability 
and their revenue generation capacity. 
Although agriculture plays a key role in the country’s economic growth and is 
a principal source of employment in the country, most of the government policies 
have been unfriendly toward this sector and there has been a declining trend of 
public investment in agriculture.  Agriculture taxation in Pakistan has generated 
ample debate both on the magnitude and various types of the taxes.  In this backdrop, 
the author of the paper has been successful in generating interest and provoking 
exiting discussion on the subject. 
Predictating on the review of the principle of optimal tax theory and current 
agriculture policy in Pakistan, the author proposes a tax system for Pakistan’s 
agriculture.  While devising the proposed tax system, he has critically assessed the 
limitations faced to the current farm tax system.   The author has come up with a 2-
tier farm-tax system including a simple land tax and a tax on marketed surplus.  In 
support of his stance, the author figures out the inefficiency of prevalent tax system 
and merits of the proposed two-pronged farm tax structure. 
The experience dictates that the most appropriate system of taxation should 
base on income and progressively move in consonance with income growth.  If 
income increases, the tax rates move upward and if, it declines, the tax rates go 
down. 
While alluding to the tax on agriculture income, the author fathoms myriad 
problems in implementation, administrative inconveniences of tax collecting 
institutions, malpractices and so on. As a matter of fact, these considerations should 
not influence in proposing a plausible tax structure.  By the recent tax reforms 
phased in by the government, the number of tax payers has proliferated to a great 
extent.  Similarly, in case of agricultural taxation, if the various income groups in 
agriculture could be brought into the tax net and once a system is in place the overall 
tax net can expand. 
According to the universal principle of taxation, agriculture should not be 
subjected to iniquitous imposition of several taxes.  The author eloquently illustrated 
that in Pakistan agriculture is subjected to direct, indirect, and implicit taxes.  Instead Waqar Malik  502
of providing a relief to the farming community who is already hard pressed and 
overtaxed, the increase in number of taxes in recent years has posed additional 
threats to the agriculture sector. 
The author also touches upon another dimension of production surpluses but 
there is no consideration to farmer’s real cost of production and the real price of 
products he receives. In most of the cases, the grower is already at the margin or a 
net loser.  As a matter of fact, in the recent decades, the farm sector has suffered a 
loss as compared to other sectors of the recent decades, the farm sector has suffered a 
loss as compared to other sectors of the economy and as a result the farm community 
has worsen off in real term.  Some additional explanations with empirical evidence 
will enhance the understanding of the readers about the optimal limit of tax criteria.  
For instance the optimal tax limit—why 5-6 percent and why not 10 percent or less 
than 5 percent. 
However, the study is unique in that it constitutes or pioneering effort in 
Pakistan’s agricultural taxation structure which needs further filed work, exploring 
all its consequences and numerous other dimensions before it is fully recommended 
as a policy option.  Also simultaneous efforts will be needed to mount a special 
campaign to create farm tax policy awareness among the farming community and to 
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